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A SIMPLE ADAPTIVE PROCEDURE LEADING TO
CORRELATED EQUILIBRIUM
1
BY SERGIU HART AND ANDREU MAS-COLELL
2
We propose a new and simple adaptive procedure for playing a game: ‘‘regret-match-
ing.’’ In this procedure, players may depart from their current play with probabilities that
are proportional to measures of regret for not having used other strategies in the past. It
is shown that our adaptive procedure guarantees that, with probability one, the empirical
distributions of play converge to the set of correlated equilibria of the game.
KEYWORDS: Adaptive procedure, correlated equilibrium, no regret, regret-matching,
simple strategies.
1. INTRODUCTION
THE LEADING NONCOOPERATIVE EQUILIBRIUM NOTIONS for N-person games in
Ž. Ž . strategic normal form are Nash equilibrium and its reﬁnements and corre-
lated equilibrium. In this paper we focus on the concept of correlated equilib-
rium.
Ž. A correlated equilibriuma notion introduced by Aumann 1974 can be
described as follows: Assume that, before the game is played, each player
Ž. receives a private signal which does not affect the payoffs . The player may then
choose his action in the game depending on this signal. A correlated equilibrium
of the original game is just a Nash equilibrium of the game with the signals.
Considering all possible signal structures generates all correlated equilibria. If
Ž. the signals are stochastically independent across the players, it is a Nash
Ž. equilibrium in mixed or pure strategies of the original game. But the signals
could well be correlated, in which case new equilibria may obtain.
Equivalently, a correlated equilibrium is a probability distribution on N-tuples
of actions, which can be interpreted as the distribution of play instructions given
to the players by some ‘‘device’’ or ‘‘referee.’’ Each player is givenprivately
instructions for his own play only; the joint distribution is known to all of them.
Also, for every possible instruction that a player receives, the player realizes that
the instruction provides a best response to the random estimated play of the
other playersassuming they all follow their instructions.
Ž. There is much to be said for correlated equilibrium. See Aumann 1974, 1987
for an analysis and foundational arguments in terms of rationality. Also, from a
1 Ž. October 1998 minor corrections: June 1999 . Previous versions: February 1998; November 1997;
Ž. December 1996; March 1996 handout . Research partially supported by grants of the U.S.-Israel
Binational Science Foundation, the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, the Spanish
Ministry of Education, and the Generalitat de Catalunya.
2 We want to acknowledge the useful comments and suggestions of Robert Aumann, Antonio
Cabrales, Dean Foster, David Levine, Alvin Roth, Reinhard Selten, Sylvain Sorin, an editor, the
anonymous referees, and the participants at various seminars where this work was presented.
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practical point of view, it could be argued that correlated equilibrium may be
the most relevant noncooperative solution concept. Indeed, with the possible
exception of well-controlled environments, it is hard to exclude a priori the
possibility that correlating signals are amply available to the players, and thus
ﬁnd their way into the equilibrium.
This paper is concerned with dynamic considerations. We pose the following
question: Are there simple adaptie procedures always leading to correlated equilib-
rium?
Ž. Foster and Vohra 1997 have obtained a procedure converging to the set of
Ž. correlated equilibria. The work of Fudenberg and Levine 1999 led to a second
one. We introduce here a procedure that we view as particularly simple and
Ž. intuitive see Section 4 for a comparative discussion of all these procedures . It
does not entail any sophisticated updating, prediction, or fully rational behavior.
Our procedure takes place in discrete time and it speciﬁes that players adjust
strategies probabilistically. This adjustment is guided by ‘‘regret measures’’
based on observation of past periods. Players know the past history of play of all
Ž players, as well as their own payoff matrix but not necessarily the payoff
. matrices of the other players . Our Main Theorem is: The adaptive procedure
generates trajectories of play that almost surely converge to the set of correlated
equilibria.
The procedure is as follows: At each period, a player may either continue
playing the same strategy as in the previous period, or switch to other strategies,
with probabilities that are proportional to how much higher his accumulated
payoff would have been had he always made that change in the past. More
precisely, let U be his total payoff up to now; for each strategy k different from
Ž. his last period strategy j, let Vk be the total payoff he would have received if
Ž he had played k every time in the past that he chose j and everything else
.Ž . remained unchanged . Then only those strategies k with Vk larger than U
may be switched to, with probabilities that are proportional to the differences
Ž. VkU, which we call the ‘‘regret’’ for having played j rather than k. These
probabilities are normalized by a ﬁxed factor, so that they add up to strictly less
than 1; with the remaining probability, the same strategy j is chosen as in the
last period.
It is worthwhile to point out three properties of our procedure. First, its
simplicity; indeed, it is very easy to explain and to implement. It is not more
ŽŽ . Ž . involved than ﬁctitious play Brown 1951 and Robinson 1951 ; note that in the
. two-person zero-sum case, our procedure also yields the minimax value . Sec-
Ž ond, the procedure is not of the ‘‘best-reply’’ variety such as ﬁctitious play,
ŽŽ . . smooth ﬁctitious play Fudenberg and Levine 1995, 1999 or calibrated learn-
ŽŽ . . . ing Foster and Vohra 1997 ; see Section 4 for further details . Players do not
choose only their ‘‘best’’ actions, nor do they give probability close to 1 to these
choices. Instead, all ‘‘better’’ actions may be chosen, with probabilities that are
proportional to the apparent gains, as measured by the regrets; the procedure
could thus be called ‘‘regret-matching.’’ And third, there is ‘‘inertia.’’ The strategy
played in the last period matters: There is always a positive probability ofCORRELATED EQUILIBRIUM 1129
continuing to play this strategy and, moreover, changes from it occur only if
there is reason to do so.
At this point a question may arise: Can one actually guarantee that the
smaller set of Nash equilibria is always reached? The answer is deﬁnitely ‘‘no.’’
On the one hand, in our procedure, as in most others, there is a natural
coordination device: the common history, observed by all players. It is thus
reasonable to expect that, at the end, independence among the players will not
obtain. On the other hand, the set of Nash equilibria is a mathematically
Ž complex set a set of ﬁxed-points; by comparison, the set of correlated equilibria
. is a convex polytope , and simple adaptive procedures cannot be expected to
guarantee the global convergence to such a set.
After this introductory section, in Section 2 we present the model, describe
Ž. the adaptive procedure, and state our result the Main Theorem . Section 3 is
devoted to a ‘‘stylized variation’’ of the procedure of Section 2. It is a variation
Ž. that lends itself to a very direct proof, based on Blackwell’s 1956a Approacha-
bility Theorem. This is a new instrument in this ﬁeld, which may well turn out to
be widely applicable.
Section 4 contains a discussion of the literature, together with a number of
relevant issues. The proof of the Main Theorem is relegated to the Appendix.
2. THE MODEL AND MAIN RESULT
ŽŽ i.Ž i.. Ž . Let  N, S , u be a ﬁnite N-person game in strategic normal i Ni  N
form: N is the set of players, S
i is the set of strategies of player i, and
u
i :Ł S
i is player i’s payoff function. All sets N and S
i are assumed to i N
be ﬁnite. Denote by SŁ S
i the set of N-tuples of strategies; the generic i N
Ž i. i element of S is s s , and s denotes the strategy combination of all i N
i Ž i

.  players except i, i.e., s  s .W efocus attention on the following solution i i
concept:
DEFINITION:A probability distribution  on S is a correlated equilibrium of 
if, for every iN, every jS
i and every kS
i we have
3
Ž.  iŽ i. iŽ.   suk , s us0. Ý
i sS : s j
If in the above inequality we replace the right-hand side by an 0, then we
obtain the concept of a correlated -equilibrium.
Note that every Nash equilibrium is a correlated equilibrium. Indeed, Nash
equilibria correspond to the special case where  is a product measure, that is,
the play of the different players is independent. Also, the set of correlated
Ž equilibria is nonempty, closed and convex, and even in simple games e.g.,
. ‘‘chicken’’ it may include distributions that are not in the convex hull of the
Nash equilibrium distributions.
3 We write Ý i for the sum over all N-tuples s in S whose ith coordinate si equals j. s S : s jSERGIU HART AND ANDREU MAS-COLELL 1130
Suppose now that the game  is played repeatedly through time: t1,2,... .
Ž. tt At time t1, given a history of play h  s Ł S,w epostulate that t  1 1
each player iN chooses s
i S
i according to a probability distribution
4
t1
i Ž i. p  S which is deﬁned in the following way: t1
For every two different strategies j, kS
i of player i, suppose i were to
replace strategy j, every time that it was played in the past, by strategy k; his
payoff at time , for t, would become
iŽ i. i uk , s ,i f s j,   i Ž. Ž. 2.1a Wj , k   i ½ Ž. us, otherwise. 
The resulting difference in i’s average payoff up to time t is then
tt 11
ii i Ž. Ž . Ž. Ž . 2.1b Dj , k  Wj , k  us ÝÝ t  tt 1 1
1
i ii Ž. Ž .  uk , s us . Ý   t i t : s j 
Finally, denote
 ii i Ž. Ž. Ž.   Ž. 4 2.1c Rj , k  Dj , k max Dj , k ,0 . tt t
iŽ. Ž . The expression Rj , k has a clear interpretation as a measure of the average t
‘‘regret’’ at period t for not having played, every time that j was played in the
past, the different strategy k.
Fix 0t ob ealarge enough number.
5 Let jS
i be the strategy last
ii Ž i. chosen by player i, i.e., js . Then the probability distribution p  S tt 1
used by i at time t1i sdeﬁned as
1 	
ii Ž. Ž . pk  Rj , k , for all kj, t1 t  
 Ž. 2.2
ii Ž. Ž. pj 1 pk . Ý t1 t1  i kS : kj
i Ž. Note that the choice of  guarantees that pj 0; that is, there is always a t1
positive probability of playing the same strategy as in the previous period. The
i Ž i. 6 play p  S at the initial period is chosen arbitrarily. 1
4 Ž. We write  Q for the set of probability distributions over a ﬁnite set Q.
5 Ž. The parameter  is ﬁxed throughout the procedure independent of time and history . It sufﬁces
iŽ i . i  iŽ.  i to take  so that 2Mm 1 for all iN, where M is an upper bound for u 	 and m is
Ž i . iŽ i. the number of strategies of player i. Even better, we could let  satisfy  m 1 uk , s 
iŽ i. i i i Ž i uj , s for all j, kS , all s S , and all iN and moreover we could use a different  for
. each player i .
6Actually, the procedure could start with any ﬁnite number of periods where the play is arbitrary.CORRELATED EQUILIBRIUM 1131
Ž. Informally, 2.2 may be described as follows. Player i starts from a ‘‘reference
point’’: his current actual play. His choice next period is governed by propensi-
ties to depart from it. It is natural therefore to postulate that, if a change occurs,
it should be to actions that are perceived as being better, relative to the current
choice. In addition, and in the spirit of adaptive behavior, we assume that all
such better choices get positive probabilities; also, the better an alternative
action seems, the higher the probability of choosing it next time. Further, there
Ž is also inertia: the probability of staying put and playing the same action as in
. the last period is always positive.
More precisely, the probabilities of switching to different strategies are
proportional to their regrets relative to the current strategy. The factor of
proportionality is constant. In particular, if the regrets are small, then the
probability of switching from current play is also small.
Ž. For every t, let z  S be the empirical distribution of the N-tuples of t
strategies played up to time t. That is, for every
7 sS,
1
Ž. Ž .  4 2.3 zs  t : s s t  t
is the relative frequency that the N-tuple s has been played in the ﬁrst t
periods. We can now state our main result.
Ž. MAIN THEOREM: If eery player plays according to the adaptie procedure 2.2 ,
then the empirical distributions of play z conerge almost surely as t
 to the set t
of correlated equilibrium distributions of the game .
Note that convergence to the set of correlated equilibria does not imply that
the sequence z converges to a point. The Main Theorem asserts that the t
Ž. following statement holds with probability one: For any 0 there is T T  00
such that for all tT we can ﬁnd a correlated equilibrium distribution  at a 0 t
Ž distance less than  from z . Note that this T depends on the history; it is an t 0
. ‘‘a.s. ﬁnite stopping time.’’ That is, the Main Theorem says that, with probability
Ž. Ž . one, for any 0, the random trajectory z , z ,...,z ,... enters and then 12 t
Ž. stays forever in the -neighborhood in  S of the set of correlated equilibria.
Ž Put differently: Given any 0, there exists a constant i.e., independent of
.Ž . history t t  such that, with probability at least 1, the empirical 00
distributions z for all tt are in the -neighborhood of the set of correlated t 0
equilibria. Finally, let us note that because the set of correlated equilibria is
Ž. nonempty and compact, the statement ‘‘the trajectory z converges to the set t
Ž. of correlated equilibria’’ is equivalent to the statement ‘‘the trajectory z is t
Ž. such that for any 0 there is T T  with the property that z is a 11 t
correlated -equilibrium for all tT .’’ 1
Ž. We conclude this section with a few comments see also Section 4 :
Ž. Ž . 1 Our adaptive procedure 2.2 requires player i to know his own payoff
Ž. matrix but not those of the other players and, at time t1, the history h ; t
7  We write Q for the number of elements of a ﬁnite set Q.SERGIU HART AND ANDREU MAS-COLELL 1132
Ž. actually, the empirical distribution z of s , s ,...,s sufﬁces. In terms of t 12 t
computation, player i needs to keep record of the time t together with the
iŽ i . iŽ. i Ž mm 1 numbers Dj , k for all jk in S and update these numbers every t
. period .
Ž. 2A t every period the adaptive procedure that we propose randomizes only
over the strategies that exhibit positive regret relative to the most recently
played strategy. Some strategies may, therefore, receive zero probability. Sup-
pose that we were to allow for trembles. Speciﬁcally, suppose that at every
Ž period we put a 0 probability on the uniform tremble each strategy thus
i. being played with probability at least m .I tcan be shown that in this case
Ž the empirical distributions z converge to the set of correlated -equilibria of t
. course,  depends on , and it goes to zero as  goes to zero . In conclusion,
Ž unlike most adaptive procedures, ours does not rely on trembles which are
. usually needed, technically, to get the ‘‘ergodicity’’ properties ; moreover, our
result is robust with respect to trembles.
Ž. 8 3 Our adaptive procedure depends only on one parameter, . This may be
ŽŽ . Ž . . viewed as an ‘‘inertia’’ parameter see Subsections 4 g and 4 h : A higher 
yields lower probabilities of switching. The convergence to the set of correlated
Ž. equilibria is always guaranteed for any large enough ; see footnote 5 , but the
speed of convergence changes with .
Ž. 4W e know little about additional convergence properties for z .I ti seasy to t
see that the empirical distributions z either converge to a Nash equilibrium in t
pure strategies, or must be inﬁnitely often outside the set of correlated equilib-
Ž 9 ria because, if z is a correlated equilibrium from some time on, then all t
. regrets are 0, and the play does not change . This implies, in particular, that
ŽŽ . . interior relative to  S points of the set of correlated equilibria that are not
Ž pure Nash equilibria are unreachable as the limit of some z but it is possible t
. that they are reachable as limits of a subsequence of z . t
Ž. 5 There are other procedures enjoying convergence properties similar to
Ž. ours: the procedures of Foster and Vohra 1997 , of Fudenberg and Levine
Ž. 1999 , and of Theorem A in Section 3 below; see the discussion in Section 4.
The delimitation of general classes of procedures converging to correlated
equilibria seems, therefore, an interesting research problem.10
3. NO REGRET AND BLACKWELL APPROACHABILITY
Ž. In this section which can be viewed as a motivational preliminary we shall
replace the adaptive procedure of Section 2 by another procedure that, while
related to it, is more stylized. Then we shall analyze it by means of Blackwell’s
Ž. 1956a Approachability Theorem, and prove that it yields convergence to the
8 Ž. Using a parameter  rather than a ﬁxed normalization of the payoffs was suggested to us by
Reinhard Selten.
9 See the Proposition in Section 3.
10 Ž. Ž. See Hart and Mas-Colell 1999 and Cahn 2000 for such results.CORRELATED EQUILIBRIUM 1133
set of correlated equilibria. In fact, the Main Theorem stated in Section 2, and
its proof in Appendix 1, were inspired by consideration and careful study of the
result of this section. Furthermore, the procedure here is interesting in its own
Ž right see, for instance, the Remark following the statement of Theorem A, and
Ž. . di n Section 4 .
Fix a player i and recall the procedure of Section 2: At time t1 the
transition probabilities, from the strategy played by player i in period t to the
strategies to be played at t1, are determined by the stochastic matrix deﬁned
Ž. i Ž iŽ. . i by the system 2.2 . Consider now an invariant probability vector q  qj tt j S
Ž i.Ž . i  S for this matrix such a vector always exists . That is, q satisﬁes t
11
ii i i i Ž. Ž. Ž . Ž. Ž . qj  qk Rk , j qj1 Rj , k , ÝÝ tt t t t  kjk j
for every jS
i.B ycollecting terms, multiplying by , and formally letting
iŽ. Rj , j 0, the above expression can be rewritten as t




In this section we shall assume that play at time t1b yplayer i is
i Ž. i Ž. iŽ. determined by a solution q to the system of equations 3.1 ; i.e., pj qj . tt 1 t
In a sense, we assume that player i at time t1 goes instantly to the invariant
Ž. distribution of the stochastic transition matrix determined by 2.2 . We now state
the key result.
THEOREM A: Suppose that at eery period t1 player i chooses strategies
i Ž. according to a probability ector q that satisﬁes 3.1 . Then player i’s regrets t
iŽ. i Rj , k conerge to zero almost surely for eery j, ki nS with jk. t
REMARK: Note thatin contrast to the Main Theorem, where every player
Ž. uses 2.2 no assumption is made in Theorem A on how players different from
Ž i choose their strategies except for the fact that for every t, given the history up
. to t, play is independent among players . In the terminology of Fudenberg and
Ž. Ž. Levine 1999, 1998 , the adaptive procedure of this section is ‘‘ universally
Ž. calibrated.’’ For an extended discussion of this issue, see Subsection 4 d .
What is the connection between regrets and correlated equilibria? It turns out
that a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for the empirical distributions to
converge to the set of correlated equilibria is precisely that all regrets converge
to zero. More generally, we have the following proposition.
Ž. Ž . PROPOSITION: Let s be a sequence of plays i.e., s S for all t and tt 1,2,... t
11 iŽ. i let 0. Then: limsup Rj , k  for eery iN and eery j, kS with t
 t
11 Note that both 0 and 0 are included.SERGIU HART AND ANDREU MAS-COLELL 1134
ŽŽ . . jk, if and only if the sequence of empirical distributions z deﬁned by 2.3 t
conerges to the set of correlated -equilibria.
PROOF: For each player i and every jk in S
i we have
1
ii ii i Ž. Ž . Ž . Dj , k  uk , s uj , s Ý t  t i t : s j 
Ž.  iŽ i. iŽ i.  zsuk , s uj , s . Ý t
i sS : s j
Ž.  On any subsequence where z converges, say z  S ,w eget tt
i Ž. Ž .  iŽ i. iŽ i.  Dj , k   suk , s uj , s . Ý t
i sS : s j
The result is immediate from the deﬁnition of a correlated -equilibrium and
Ž. 2.1c . Q.E.D.
Theorem A and the Proposition immediately imply the following corollary.
COROLLARY: Suppose that at each period t1 eery player i chooses strategies
i Ž. according to a probability ector q that satisﬁes 3.1 . Then the empirical distribu- t
tions of play z conerge almost surely as t
 to the set of correlated equilibria of t
the game .
Before addressing the formal proof of Theorem A, we shall present and
discuss Blackwell’s Approachability Theorem.
Ž. i The basic setup contemplates a decision-maker i with a ﬁnite action set S .
 For a ﬁnite indexing set L, the decision-maker receives an L-dimensional
Ž i i. Li i vector payoff  s , s  that depends on his action s S and on some
i Ž. i Ž external action s belonging to a ﬁnite set S we will refer to i as the
.Ž i i. ‘‘opponent’’ . The decision problem is repeated through time. Let s  s , s tt t
S
iS
i denote the choices at time t;o fcourse, both i and i may use
randomizations. The question is whether the decision-maker i can guaran-
Ž. Ž . tee that the time average of the vector payoffs, D  1t Ý  s  t  t 
Ž. Ž i i.Ž L. 1t Ý  s , s , approaches a predetermined set in  .  t 
Let C C be a convex and closed subset of 
L. The set C C is approachable by the
decision-maker i if there is a procedure
12 for i that guarantees that the average
Ž 13 Ž. vector payoff D approaches the set C C i.e., dist D ,C C 0 almost surely as tt
. t
 , regardless of the choices of the opponent i.T ostate Blackwell’s result,
12 Ž. In the repeated setup, we refer to a behavior strategy as a ‘‘procedure.’’
13 Ž.    4  dist x, A min xa : aA , where 	 is the Euclidean norm. Strictly speaking, Blackwell’s
deﬁnition of approachability requires also that the convergence of the distance to 0 be uniform over
the procedures of the opponent; i.e., there is a procedure of i such that for every 0 there is
Ž.  Ž.  t t  such that for any procedure of i we have P dist D ,C C 	 for all tt 1. The 00 t 0
Ž. Blackwell procedure deﬁned in the next Theorem guarantees this as well.CORRELATED EQUILIBRIUM 1135
Ž.   let w denote the support function of the convex set C C, i.e., w  sup 	c: C C C C
4 LL Ž. cC C for all  in  . Given a point x which is not in C C, let Fx be
Ž. the unique point in C C that is closest to x in the Euclidean distance, and
Ž. Ž. Ž. put  x xFx; note that  x is an outward normal to the set C C at the
Ž. point Fx.
BLACKWELL’S APPROACHABILITY THEOREM: Let C C
L be a conex and
closed set, with support function w . Then C C is approachable by i if and only if for C C
L Ž i. 14 eery  there exists a mixed strategy q  S such that 
Ž. Ž i.Ž . i i 3.2 	 q , s w  , for all s S .  C C
Ž. Moreoer, the following procedure of i guarantees that dist D ,C C conerges almost t
surely to 0 as t
: At time t1, play q if D C C, and play arbitrarily ŽD . t t
if D C C. t
We will refer to the condition for approachability given in the Theorem as the
Blackwell condition, and to the procedure there as the Blackwell procedure.T o
Ž. get some intuition for the result, assume that D is not in C C, and let H H D be tt
L Ž. the half-space of  that contains C C and not D and is bounded by the t
Ž. Ž. supporting hyperplane to C C at FD with normal  D ; see Figure 1. When i tt
Ž i.Ž . uses the Blackwell procedure, it guarantees that  q , s lies in H H D for ŽD . t t i i ŽŽ. . all s in S by 3.2 . Therefore, given D , the expectation of the next period t
FIGURE 1.Approaching the set C C.
14 Ž i.Ž i.Ži i. ii  q, s denotes the expected payoff, i.e., Ý qs  s , s .O fcourse, only 0 with s  S
Ž. Ž . w  	
 need to be considered in 3.2 . C CSERGIU HART AND ANDREU MAS-COLELL 1136
 Ž.  Ž. i payoff E  s 
D will lie in the half-space H H D for any pure choice s of t1 tt t 1
i at time t1, and thus also for any randomized choice of i. The expected
Ž. average vector payoff at period t1 conditional on D is t
t 1
  Ž.  ED 
D  D  E  s 
D . t1 tt t 1 t t1 t1
 Ž. When t is large, ED 
D will thus be inside the circle of center FD and t1 tt
 Ž.  radius  D . Hence t
Ž  .  Ž. Ž. dist ED 
D ,C C  ED 
D FD 	  D t1 tt 1 tt t
Ž. dist D ,C C t
ŽŽ . . the ﬁrst inequality follows from the fact that FD is in C C .Aprecise t
computation shows that the distance not only decreases, but actually goes to
15 16 Ž. zero. For proofs of Blackwell’s Approachability Theory, see Blackwell 1956a ,
Ž. or Mertens, Sorin, and Zamir 1995, Theorem 4.3 .
We now prove Theorem A.
PROOF OF THEOREM A: As mentioned, the proof of this Theorem consists of
an application of Blackwell’s Approachability Theorem. Let
 Ž. ii 4 L j, k S S : jk ,
Ž i i. L Ž. and deﬁne the vector payoff  s , s  by letting its j, k L coordin-
ate be
iŽ i.Ž i. i uk , s uj , s ,i f s j, i i  Ž. Ž.  s , sj , k ½ 0, otherwise.
L   L 4 Let C C be the nonpositive orthant   x : x0.We claim that C C is 
Ž. approachable by i. Indeed, the support function of C C is given by w  0 for C C
L Ž. L all  and w  
 otherwise; so only  need to be considered.  C C 
Ž. Condition 3.2 is
Ž. Ž i. Ž i i.Ž.  j, kq s  s , sj , k 0, ÝÝ 
ii Ž. j, k L s S
or
Ž. Ž . Ž .  iŽ i. iŽ i. 3.3  j, kq j u k , s uj , s 0 Ý 
Ž. j, k L
15 Note that one looks here at expected average payoffs; the Strong Law of Large Numbers for
Dependent Random Variablessee the Proof of Step M10 in the Appendiximplies that the
actual average payoffs also converge to the set C C.
16 Ž. Ži. The Blackwell condition is usually stated as follows: For every xC C there exists qx S
 Ž. ŽŽ. i.Ž .  i i such that xFx 	  qx, s Fx 0, for all s S .I ti seasy to verify that this is
equivalent to our formulation. We further note a simple way of stating the Blackwell result: A
convex set C C is approachable if and only if any half-space containing C C is approachable.CORRELATED EQUILIBRIUM 1137
i i Ž. for all s S . After collecting terms, the left-hand side of 3.3 can be written
as
Ž. Ž . iŽ i. 3.4a  ju j , s , Ý
i jS
where
Ž. Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . 3.4b  j  qk  k, j qj  j, k . ÝÝ  
ii kSk S
Ž i. ii Let q  S be an invariant vector for the nonnegative S S matrix with 
Ž. Ž . entries  j, k for jk and 0 for jk such a q always exists . That is, q  
satisﬁes
Ž. Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . 3.5 qk  k, j qj  j, k , ÝÝ  
ii kSk S
i Ž. i Ž. for every jS . Therefore  j 0 for all jS , and so inequality 3.3 holds
Ž 17. i i true as an equality for all s S . The Blackwell condition is thus satisﬁed
by the set C C
L. 
Ž. Consider D , the average payoff vector at time t. Its j, k -coordinate is t
Ž.  Ž. Ž. iŽ. L 1t Ý  sj , k Dj , k .I fD  , then the closest point to D in  t  tt  t
L Ž.  Ž. Ž .      is FD D see Figure 2 , hence  D D  D  D   tt t t t t
Ž iŽ. . Rj , k , which is the vector of regrets at time t. Now the given strategy t Ž j, k. L
FIGURE 2.Approaching C C L. 
17 Ž. Note that this is precisely Formula 2 in the Proof of Theorem 1 in Hart and Schmeidler
Ž. Ž . 1989 ; see Subsection 4 i .SERGIU HART AND ANDREU MAS-COLELL 1138
Ž. Ž. Ž. of i at time t1 satisﬁes 3.1 , which is exactly condition 3.5 for  D . t
Hence player i uses the Blackwell procedure for 
L, which guarantees that the 
Li Ž. average vector payoff D approaches  ,o rRj , k 0 a.s. for every jk. t  t
Q.E.D.
REMARK: The proof of Blackwell’s Approachability Theorem also provides
bounds on the speed of convergence. In our case, one gets the following: The
i '  Ž.  expectation ER j , k of the regrets is of the order of 1 t , and the probabil- t
cT Ž ity that z is a correlated -equilibrium for all tT is at least 1ce for an t
Ž appropriate constant c0 depending on ; see Foster and Vohra 1999,
.. 18 Section 4.1 . Clearly, a better speed of convergence for the expected regrets
cannot be guaranteed, since, for instance, if the other players play stationary
' mixed strategies, then the errors are of the order 1 t by the Central Limit
Theorem.
4. DISCUSSION
This section discusses a number of important issues, including links and
comparisons to the relevant literature.
Ž. a Foster and Vohra. The seminal paper in this ﬁeld of research is Foster and
Ž. Vohra 1997 . They consider, ﬁrst, ‘‘forecasting rules’’on the play of
othersthat enjoy good properties, namely, ‘‘calibration.’’ Second, they assume
that each player best-replies to such calibrated forecasts. The resulting proce-
dure leads to correlated equilibria. The motivation and the formulation are
quite different from ours; nonetheless, their results are close to our results
Ž. speciﬁcally, to our Theorem A , since their calibrated forecasts are also based
on regret measures.
19
Ž. b Fudenberg and Leine. The next important paper is Fudenberg and Levine
Ž. Ž Ž. . 1999 see also their book 1998 . In that paper they offer a class of adaptive
procedures, called ‘‘calibrated smooth ﬁctitious play,’’ with the property that for
every 0 there are procedures in the class that guarantee almost sure
Ž convergence to the set of correlated -equilibria but the conclusion does not
. hold for 0.The formal structure of these procedures is also similar to that
of our Theorem A, in the sense that the mixed choice of a given player at time t
is determined as an invariant probability vector of a transition matrix. However,
Ž. the transition matrix and therefore the stochastic dynamics is different from
the regret-based transition matrix of our Theorem A. To understand further the
similarities and differences between the Fudenberg and Levine procedures and
Ž. Ž. our own, the next two Subsections, c and d , contain a detour on the concepts
of ‘‘universal consistency’’ and ‘‘universal calibration.’’
18 Up to a constant factor.
19 Ž i. These regrets are deﬁned on an -grid on  S , with  going to zero as t goes to inﬁnity.
Therefore, at each step in their procedure one needs to compute the invariant vector for a matrix of
an increasingly large size; by comparison, in our Theorem A the size of the matrix is ﬁxed, mimi.CORRELATED EQUILIBRIUM 1139
Ž. c Uniersal Consistency. The term ‘‘universal consistency’’ is due to Fuden-
Ž. Ž. berg and Levine 1995 . The concept goes back to Hannan 1957 , who proved
Ž. the following result: There is a procedure in the setup of Section 2 for player i
that guarantees, no matter what the other players do, that
tt 11
i ii Ž. Ž . Ž . 4.1 limsup max uk , s  us 0a . s . ÝÝ  
i tt kS t
 1 1
In other words, i’s average payoff is, in the limit, no worse than if he were to
play any constant strategy kS
i for all t. This property of the Hannan
procedure for player i is called uniersal consistency by Fudenberg and Levine
Ž. Ž . 1995 it is ‘‘universal’’ since it holds no matter how the other players play .
Ž. Another universally consistent procedure was shown by Blackwell 1956b to
ŽŽ result from his Approachability Theorem see also Luce and Raiffa 1957, pp.
.. 482483 .
The adaptive procedure of our Theorem A is also universally consistent.
i Ž. Indeed, for each j in S , 4.1 is guaranteed even when restricted to those
periods when player i chose that particular j; this being true for all j in S
i, the
result follows. However, the application of Blackwell’s Approachability Theorem
in Section 3 suggests the following particularly simple procedure.
At time t, for each strategy k in S
i, let
t 1
ii ii Ž. Ž . Ž . Ž . 4.2a Dk  uk , s us , Ý t  t 1
 iŽ. Dk t i Ž. Ž . 4.2b pk  ,  t1  iŽ. Dk Ý t
 i k S
i Ž i. if the denominator is positive, and let p  S be arbitrary otherwise. The t1
strategy of player i is then, at time t1, to choose k in S
i with probability
i Ž. pk . These probabilities are thus proportional to the ‘‘unconditional regrets’’ t1
 iŽ.  Ž. Dk by comparison to the ‘‘conditional on j’’ regrets of Section 2 . We t
then have the following theorem.
Ž. THEOREM B: The adaptie procedure 4.2 is uniersally consistent for player i.
The proof of Theorem B is similar to the proof of Theorem A in Section 3
and is omitted.
Ž. Fudenberg and Levine 1995 propose a class of procedures that turn out to
be universally -consistent:
20 ‘‘smooth ﬁctitious play.’’ Player i follows a smooth
i Ž i. ﬁctitious play behavior rule if at time t he plays a mixed strategy   S that
Ž maximizes the sum of his expected payoff with the actions of the remaining
20 Ž. That is, the right-hand side of 4.1 is 0 instead of 0.SERGIU HART AND ANDREU MAS-COLELL 1140
. iŽ i. players distributed as in the empirical distribution up to t and   , where
0 and 
i is a strictly concave smooth function deﬁned on i’s strategy
Ž i.Ž i. simplex,  S , with inﬁnite length gradient at the boundary of  S . The result
of Fudenberg and Levine is then that, given any 0, there is a sufﬁciently
small  such that universal -consistency obtains for player i. Observe that, for
Ž small , smooth ﬁctitious play is very close to ﬁctitious play it amounts to
playing the best response with high probability and the remaining strategies with
. low but positive probability . The procedure is, therefore, clearly distinct from
Ž. Ž. 4.2 : In 4.2 all the better, even if not best, replies are played with signiﬁcant
Ž. probability; also, in 4.2 the inferior replies get zero probability. Finally, it is
worth emphasizing that the tremble from best response is required for the
Fudenberg and Levine result, since ﬁctitious play is not guaranteed to be
Ž. consistent. In contrast, the procedure of 4.2 has no trembles.
Ž. The reader is referred to Hart and Mas-Colell 1999 , where a wide class of
Ž universally consistent procedures is exhibited and characterized including as
Ž. . special cases 4.2 as well as smooth ﬁctitious play .
Ž. 21 d Uniersal Calibration. The idea of ‘‘universal calibration,’’ also introduced
Ž. by Fudenberg and Levine 1998, 1999 , is that, again, regret measures go to zero
irrespective of the other players’ play. The difference is that, now, the set of
regret measures is richer: It consists of regrets that are conditional on the
strategy currently played by i himself. Recall the Proposition of Section 3: If
such universally calibrated strategies are played by all players, then all regrets
become nonpositive in the limit, and thus the convergence to the correlated
equilibrium set is guaranteed.
Ž. The procedure of Theorem A is universally calibrated; so up to  is the
Ž. ‘‘calibrated smooth ﬁctitious play’’ of Fudenberg and Levine 1999 . The two
procedures stand to each other as, in the unconditional version, Theorem B
stands to ‘‘smooth ﬁctitious play.’’
Ž. The procedure 2.2 of our Main Theorem is not universally calibrated. If only
player i follows the procedure, we cannot conclude that all his regrets go to
zero; adversaries who know the procedure used by player i could keep his
regrets positive.
22 Such sophisticated strategies of the other players, however,
are outside the framework of our studywhich deals with simple adaptive
behavior. In fact, it turns out that the procedure of our Main Theorem is
guaranteed to be calibrated not just against opponents using the same proce-
dure, but also against a wide class of behaviors.
23
Ž. We regard the simplicity of 2.2 as a salient point. Of course, if one needs to
guarantee calibration even against sophisticated adversaries, one may have to
give up on simplicity and resort to the procedure of Theorem A instead.
21 They actually call it ‘‘calibration’’; we prefer the term ‘‘universal calibration,’’ since it refers to
Ž  . any behavior of the opponents as in their ‘‘ conditional universal consistency’’ .
22 Ž. At each time t1, let them play an N1 -tuple of strategies that minimizes the expected
Ž i .Ž . relative to p payoff of player i; for an example, see Fudenberg and Levine 1998, Section 8.10 . t1
23 Namely, such that the dependence of any one choice of i on any one past choice of i is small,
Ž. relative to the number of periods; see Cahn 2000 .CORRELATED EQUILIBRIUM 1141
Ž. e Better-reply s. Best-reply. Note that all the procedures in the literature
Ž. reviewed above are best-reply-based: A player uses almost exclusively actions
Ž. that are almost best-replies to a certain belief about his opponents. In contrast,
our procedure gives signiﬁcant probabilities to any actions that are just better
Ž. rather than best . This has the additional effect of making the behavior
continuous, without need for approximations.
Ž. f Eigenector Procedures. The procedure of our Main Theorem differs from
Ž all the other procedures leading to correlated equilibria including that of our
. Theorem A in an important aspect: It does not require the player to compute,
Ž. at every step, an invariant eigen- vector for an appropriate positive matrix.
24 Ž. Again, the simplicity of 2.2 is an essential property when discussing nonso-
phisticated behavior; this is the reason we have sought this result as our Main
Theorem.
Ž. g Inertia.Aspeciﬁc and most distinctive feature by which the procedure of
our Main Theorem differs from those of Theorem A and the other works
mentioned above is that in the former the individual decisions privilege the most
recent action taken: The probabilities used at period t1 are best thought of as
propensities to depart from the play at t.
Viewed in this light, our procedure has signiﬁcant inertial characteristics. In
particular, there is a positive probability of moving from the strategy played at t
Ž only if there is another that appears better in which case the probabilities of
playing the better strategies are proportional to the regrets relative to the period
. 25 t strategy .
Ž. Ž . h Friction. The procedure 2.2 exhibits ‘‘friction’’: There is always a positive
probability of continuing with the period t strategy.
26 To understand the role
27 Ž. played by friction, suppose that we were to modify the procedure 2.2 by
requiring that the switching probabilities be rescaled in such a way that a switch
Ž occurs if and only if there is at least one better strategy i.e., one with positive
. regret . Then the result of the Main Theorem may not hold. For example, in the
familiar two-person 22 coordination game, if we start with an uncoordinated
strategy pair, then the play alternates between the two uncoordinated pairs.
However, no distribution concentrated on these two pairs is a correlated
equilibrium.
It is worth emphasizing that in our result the breaking away from a bad cycle,
like the one just described, is obtained not by ergodic arguments but by the
Ž. probability of staying put i.e., by friction . What matters is that the diagonal of
24 For a good test of the simplicity of a procedure, try to explain it verbally; in particular, consider
the procedure of our Main Theorem vs. those requiring the computation of eigenvectors.
25 It is worth pointing out that if a player’s last choice was j, then the relative probabilities of
switching to k or to k
 do not depend only on the average utilities that would have been obtained if
j had been changed to k or to k
 in the past, but also on the average utility that was obtained in
Ž  those periods by playing j itself it is the magnitude of the increases in moving from j to k or to k
. that matters .
26 Ž. Ž. See Sanchirico 1996 and Section 4.6 in Fudenberg and Levine 1998 for a related point in a
best-reply context.
27 See Step M7 in the Proof of the Main Theorem in the Appendix.SERGIU HART AND ANDREU MAS-COLELL 1142
the transition matrix be positive, rather than that all the entries be positive
Ž. which, indeed, will not hold in our case .
Ž. i The set of correlated equilibria. The set of correlated equilibria of a game is,
in contrast to the set of Nash equilibria, geometrically simple: It is a convex set
Ž. actually, a convex polytope of distributions. Since it includes the Nash equilib-
Ž. Ž ria we know it is nonempty. Hart and Schmeidler 1989 see also Nau and
Ž. . Ž . McCardle 1990 provide an elementary nonﬁxed point proof of the nonempti-
ness of the set of correlated equilibria. This is done by using the Minimax
Theorem. Speciﬁcally, Hart and Schmeidler proceed by associating to the given
N-person game an auxiliary two-person zero-sum game. As it turns out, the
correlated equilibria of the original game correspond to the maximin strategies
of player I in the auxiliary game. More precisely, in the HartSchmeidler
auxiliary game, player I chooses a distribution over N-tuples of actions, and
player II chooses a pair of strategies for one of the N original players
Ž. interpreted as a play and a suggested deviation from it . The payoff to auxiliary
player II is the expected gain of the designated original player if he were to
follow the change suggested by auxiliary player II. In other words, it is the
‘‘regret’’ of that original player for not deviating. The starting point for our
research was the observation that ﬁctitious play applied to the HartSchmeidler
Ž. auxiliary game must converge, by the result of Robinson 1951 , and thus yield
optimal strategies in the auxiliary game, in particular for player Ihence,
correlated equilibria in the original game. A direct application of this idea does
not, however, produce anything that is simple and separable across the N
Ž players i.e., such that the choice of each player at time t is made independently
. 28 of the other players’ choices at tan indispensable requirement . Yet,
our adaptive procedure is based on ‘‘no-regret’’ ideas motivated by this analysis
and it is the direct descendantseveral modiﬁcations laterof this line of
research.
29
Ž. j The case of the unknown game. The adaptive procedure of Section 2 can be
modiﬁed
30 to yield convergence to correlated equilibria also in the case where
players neither know the game, nor observe the choices of the other players.
31
Speciﬁcally, in choosing play probabilities at time t1, a player uses informa-
Ž tion only on his own actual past play and payoffs and not on the payoffs that
. would have been obtained if his past play had been different . The construction
28 This needed ‘‘decoupling’’ across the N original players explains why applying linear program-
ming-type methods to reach the convex polytope of correlated equilibria is not a fruitful approach.
ŽŽ . . The resulting procedures operate in the space of N-tuples of strategies S more precisely, in  S ,
ŽŽ i.. whereas adaptive procedures should be deﬁned for each player i separately i.e., on  S .
29 Ž. For another interesting use of the auxiliary two-person zero-sum game, see Myerson 1997 .
30 Following a suggestion of Dean Foster.
31 Ž. Ž. Ž. For similar constructions, see: Banos 1968 , Megiddo 1980 , Foster and Vohra 1993 , Auer ˜
Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž et al. 1995 , Roth and Erev 1995 , Erev and Roth 1998 , Camerer and Ho 1998 , Marimon 1996,
.Ž . Section 3.4 , and Fudenberg and Levine 1998, Section 4.8 . One may view this type of result in
terms of ‘‘stimulus-response’’ decision behavior models.CORRELATED EQUILIBRIUM 1143
iŽ. ŽŽ . . is based on replacing Dj , k see 2.1b by t
iŽ. 1 pj  ii i Ž. Ž . Ž . Cj , k  us us . ÝÝ t  iŽ. t pk ii  t : s k t : s j  
Thus, the payoff that player i would have received had he played k rather than
j is estimated by the actual payoffs he obtained when he did play k in the past.
For precise formulations, results and proofs, as well as further discussions,
Ž. the reader is referred to Hart and Mas-Colell 2000 .
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APPENDIX : PROOF OF THE MAIN THEOREM
This appendix is devoted to the proof of the Main Theorem, stated in Section 2. The proof is
Ž. inspired by the result of Section 3 Theorem A . It is however more complex on account of our
transition probabilities not being the invariant measures that, as we saw in Section 3, ﬁtted so well
with Blackwell’s Approachability Theorem.
As in the standard proof of Blackwell’s Approachability Theorem, the proof of our Main
Theorem is based on a recursive formula for the distance of the vector of regrets to the negative
Ž. orthant. However, our procedure 2.2 does not satisfy the Blackwell condition; it is rather a sort of
Ž. iterative approximation to it. Thus, a simple one-period recursion from t to t1 does not sufﬁce,
and we have to consider instead a multi-period recursion where a large ‘‘block’’ of periods, from t to
t,i scombined together. Both t and  are carefully chosen; in particular, t and  go to inﬁnity,
but  is relatively small compared to t.
We start by introducing some notation. Fix player i in N. For simplicity, we drop reference to the
Ž ii index i whenever this cannot cause confusion thus we write D and R instead of D and R , and tt tt
.  i so on . Let m S be the number of strategies of player i, and let M be an upper bound on i’s
 iŽ.   Ž . ii 4 L possible payoffs: M us for all s in S. Denote L j, k S S : jk ; then  is the
Ž. mm 1 -dimensional Euclidean space with coordinates indexed by L. For each t1,2,... and
Ž. 32 each j, k in L, put
Ž.  iŽ i. iŽ.  i Aj , k 1 uk , s us , t  s j4 tt t
1
Ž. Ž. Dj , k  Aj , k , Ý t  t 1
  Ž. Ž.  Ž.  Rj , k Dj , k  Dj , k . tt t
ŽŽ . . L  We shall write A for the vector Aj , k  ; the same goes for D , D , R , and so on. Let tt j  kt t t
32 We write 1 for the indicator of the event G. GSERGIU HART AND ANDREU MAS-COLELL 1144
Ž. Ž  	,	 denote the transition probabilities from t to t1 these are computed after period t, based t
. on h : t
1 	 Ž. Rj , k ,i f kj, t  
 Ž.  j, k  t 1  Ž. 1 Rj , k ,i f kj. Ý t    k j
Thus, at time t1 the strategy used by player i is to choose each kSi with probability
i Ž. Ži .Ž . i pk  s , k . Note that the choice of  guarantees that  j, j 0 for all jS and all t. t1 tt t
Finally, let
2 L  Ž.    dist D , tt 
Ž L. L be the squared distance in  of the vector D to the nonpositive orthant  . Since the closest t 
L 33    2   2  Ž. 2 point to D in  is D ,w ehave   D D  D Ý Dj , k . t  tt t t t j  kt
Ž. It will be convenient to use the standard ‘‘O’’ notation: For two real-valued functions f 	 and
Ž. Ž . Ž Ž . . g 	 deﬁned on a domain X,‘ ‘ fxOgx ’’ means that there exists a constant K	
 such that
 Ž.  Ž. 34 fxKg x for all x in X.W ewrite P for Probability, and E for Expectation. From now on, t,
Ž. i , and w will denote positive integers; h  s will be histories of length t; j, k, and s will be t   t
elements of Si; s and si will be elements of S and Si, respectively. Unless stated otherwise, all
statements should be understood to hold ‘‘for all t, , h , j, k, etc.’’; where histories h are tt
concerned, only those that occur with positive probability are considered.
We divide the proof of the Main Theorem into 11 steps, M1M11, which we now state formally;
an intuitive guide follows.
 Step M1:

2 22 Ž. Ž.   Ž. i Et   
h t  2tR 	EA 
h O  ; and Ý t tt t t wt
w1
2 22 Ž. Ž . Ž . ii t  t  Ot  . t t
Deﬁne
Ž i.Ž .  Ž i.  Ž i.   j, s   k, jPs  k, s 
h Ps  j, s 
h . Ý t,wt t wt t wt
i kS
 Step M2:
 Ž i. iŽ i. R 	EA 
h  j, su j , s . ÝÝ tt wt t ,w
i ii s Sj S
 Step M3:

Ž. Ž. Rj , k Rj , k O . t t ž/ t
Ž. For each t0 and each history h , deﬁne an auxiliary stochastic process s with values ˆ tt ww 0,1,2,...







s ,...,s   s , s . ˆˆ ˆ ˆ Ł twt t w1 tt w1
 i N
33    4  Ž Ž. . We write x for min x,0,and D for the vector Dj , k . tt Ž j, k. L
34 The domain X will usually be the set of positive integers, or the set of vectors whose
Ž. Ž .  Ž.  coordinates are positive integers. Thus when we write, say, ft , O  ,i tmeans ft , K for
Ž. all  and t. The constants K will always depend only on the game through N, m, M, and so on and
on the parameter .
35 i
  Ž i. We write  for the transition probability matrix of player i thus  is  . t ttCORRELATED EQUILIBRIUM 1145
ŽThe s-process is thus stationary: It uses the transition probabilities of period t at each period tw, ˆ
. for all w0.
 Step M4:
w2
  Ps s
h Ps s
h O . ˆ twt t wtž/ t
Deﬁne
Ž i.Ž .  Ž i.  Ž i.   j, s   k, jPs  k, s 
h Ps  j, s 




i i Ž. Ž.  j, s  j, s O . ˆ t,wt ,w ž/ t
 Step M6:
Ž i.  i i  w1 wŽ i .  j, s Ps s 
h   s , j , ˆˆ t,wt wt tt t
w Ž. w  w1 wŽ i .Ž i . where    is the wth power of the matrix  , and   s , j denotes the s , j tt t t t t t
element of the matrix  w1 w. tt
 Step M7:
Ž 1.Ž 12.  j, s Ow . ˆt,w
 Step M8:
2 23 1 2 Ž.  Ž. Et   
h t  O  t . t tt
 53 53 For each n1,2,...,let t  n be the largest integer not exceeding n . n
 Step M9:
 2  2 Ž 2. Et  
h t  On . n1 ttn t n1 nn
 Step M10:
lim  0a . s . tn n

 Step M11:
Ž. lim Rj , k 0a . s . t
t

ŽŽ . . We now provide an intuitive guide to the proof. The ﬁrst step M1 i is our basic recursion
Ž equation. In Blackwell’s Theorem, the middle term on the right-hand side vanishes it is 0b y
Ž. . 3.2 . This is not so in our case; Steps M2M8 are thus devoted to estimating this term. Step M2
Ž. yields an expression similar to 3.4 , but here the coefﬁcients  depend also on the moves of the
i i Ž other players. Indeed, given h , the choices s and s are not independent when w1 since tt wt w
.Ž . the transition probabilities change with time . Therefore we replace the process s by tw 0 w
Ž. Ž . another process s , with a stationary transition matrix that of period t . For w small ˆ tw 0 w
Ž. relative to t, the change in probabilities is small see Steps M3 and M4 , and we estimate the total
Ž. Ž. Ž difference Step M5 . Next Step M6 , we factor out the moves of the other players which, in the
. s-process, are independent of the moves of player i from the coefﬁcients .A tthis point we get the ˆˆSERGIU HART AND ANDREU MAS-COLELL 1146
Ž difference between the transition probabilities after w periods and after w1 periods for
Ž. comparison, in formula 3.4 we would replace both by the invariant distribution, so the difference
.Ž . vanishes . This difference is shown Step M7 to be small, since w is large and the transition matrix
36 Ž. has all its diagonal elements strictly positive. Substituting in M1 i yields the ﬁnal recursive
Ž. Ž . formula Step M8 . The proof is now completed Steps M9M11 by considering a carefully chosen
Ž. subsequence of periods t . nn 1,2,...
The rest of this Appendix contains the proofs of the Steps M1M11.
  L PROOF OF STEP M1: Because D  we have t 
2  t 1 2     D D  D  A D Ý t t tt t wt t t w1
2  t 2t 2    Ž. Ž .  D D  A D 	 D D Ý tt t wt tt 22 Ž. Ž. t t w1
2 2   1
  A D Ý twt 2  Ž. t w1
2  2 t 2t 
2 Ž.    A 	R  mm 11 6 M . Ý tt wt 22 2 Ž. Ž. Ž. t t t w1
 iŽ.  Ž.  Ž.  Indeed: usM,s o Aj , k 2M and Dj , k 2M, yielding the upper bound on the third twt
term. As for the second term, note that R DD D and D	D0. This gives the bound tt tt tt
Ž. Ž . Ž . of ii . To get i , take conditional expectation given the history h so  and R are known . Q.E.D. tt t
 PROOF OF STEP M2: We have
 Ž.  Ž i. iŽ i. iŽ i. EA j , k 
h   j, su k , s uj , s , Ý twt
i s
Ž i.  Ž i.  where  j, s Ps  j, s 
h .S o twt
 Ž. Ž i. iŽ i. iŽ i. R 	EA 
h  Rj , k  j, su k , s uj , s ÝÝ Ý tt wt t
i jk j s
i i i i Ž. Ž . Ž. Ž . Ž.  uj , sR k , j  k, s  Rj , k  j, s ÝÝ Ý Ý tt
i jk jk j s
Ž iŽ i.. Ž . Ž. we have collected together all terms containing uj , s . Now, Rk , j  k, j for kj, and tt
Ž. Ž Ž. . Ý Rj , k  1 j, j by deﬁnition, so k jt t
i i i i  Ž. Ž . Ž. Ž. R 	EA 
h  uj , s  k, j  k, s  j, s ÝÝ Ý tt wt t
i jk s
Ž i. note that the last sum is now over all k in S . Q.E.D.
 PROOF OF STEP M3: This follows immediately from

Ž.  Ž. Ž.  Ž. Ž. t Dj , k Dj , k  Aj , k Dj , k , Ý t tt wt
w1
 Ž.  Ž.  together with Aj , k 2M and Dj , k 2M. Q.E.D. twt
36 For further discussion on this point, see the Proof of Step M7.CORRELATED EQUILIBRIUM 1147
 PROOF OF STEP M4: We need the following Lemma, which gives bounds for the changes in the
w-step transition probabilities as a function of changes in the 1-step transitions.
Ž. Ž . LEMMA: Let X and Y be two stochastic processes with alues in a ﬁnite set B. Assume nn 0 nn 0
X Y and 00
   PXb 
X b ,...,X b PYb 
Y b ,...,Y b  nn 00 n1 n1 nn 00 n1 n1 n
for all n1 and all b ,...,b , b B. Then 0 n1 n
 PX b 
X b ,...,X b nwn w 00 n1 n1
w
  PY b 
Y b ,...,Y b  B  Ý nwn w 00 n1 n1 nr
r0
for all n1, w0, and all b ,...,b , b B. 0 n1 nw
Ž. Ž . PROOF:W ewrite P and P for the probabilities of the two processes X and Y , XY n nn n
Ž    respectively thus Pb 
b ,...,b stands for PX b 
X b ,...,X b , and Xn w 0 n1 nwn w 00 n1 n1
. so on . The proof is by induction on w.
 Pb 
b ,...,b Xn w 0 n1
   Pb 
b ,...,bPb 
b ,...,b Ý Xn w 0 nXn0 n1
bn
w
    Pb 
b ,...,bPb 
b ,...,b  B  ÝÝ Yn w 0 nXn0 n1 nr
br 1 n
w
 Ž  .   Pb 
b ,...,bP b 
b ,...,b   B  ÝÝ Yn w 0 nY n 0 n1 nn r
br 1 n
w
   Pb 
b ,...,b  B   B  Ý Yn w 0 n1 nn r
r1
Ž. the ﬁrst inequality is by the induction hypothesis . Exchanging the roles of X and Y completes
the proof. Q.E.D.
 Ž We proceed now with the proof of Step M4. From t to tw there are Nwtransitions at each
. period, think of the players moving one after the other, in some arbitrary order . Step M3 im-
plies that each transition probability for the s-process differs from the corresponding one for ˆ
Ž.   Ž. the s-process by at most Ow t , which yields, by the Lemma, a total difference of NwSOw t
Ž 2 . Owt . Q.E.D.
 PROOF OF STEP M5: Immediate by Step M4. Q.E.D.
 i

Ž. PROOF OF STEP M6: Given h , the random variables s are independent over the ˆ tt ww
different players i
 in N; indeed, the transition probabilities are all determined at time t, and the
players randomize independently. Hence:
 Ž i.  i i  i  Ps  j, s 
h Ps s 
hP s j
h , ˆˆ ˆ twt t wt t wt
implying that
i i ii i Ž.  Ž.     j, s Ps s 
h  k, jPs k
h Ps j
h . ˆˆ ˆ ˆ Ý t,wt wt t t wt t wt
i kSSERGIU HART AND ANDREU MAS-COLELL 1148
 i  i Now Ps j
h is the probability of reaching j in w steps starting from s , using the transition ˆ twt t
 i  Ž i . w Ž. w probability matrix  . Therefore Ps j
h is the s , j -element of the wth power    ˆ tt wt t t t
 wŽ i . of  , i.e.,  s , j . Hence tt t
i i iw i w i Ž.  Ž.  Ž.  Ž.  j, s Ps s 
h  k, j  s , k   s , j ˆˆÝ t,wt wt t t t t t
i kS
 i i  w1Ž i .  wŽ i . Ps s 
h  s , j   s , j , ˆ twt t t t t
completing the proof. Q.E.D.
 ŽŽ . PROOF OF STEP M7: It follows from M6 using the following Lemma recall that  j, j 0 for t
i. all jS .
LEMMA: Let  be an mm stochastic matrix with all of its diagonal entries positie. Then
 w1 wŽ. Ž 12.   j, k Ow for all j, k1,...,m.
37 Ž. PROOF: Let 0b ealower bound on all the diagonal entries of , i.e., min  j, j .W e j
Ž. can then write I 1 , where  is also a stochastic matrix. Now
w
r w ww rr Ž.    1 , Ýž/ r
r0
and similarly for  w1. Subtracting yields
w1
r w w1 ww rr Ž.     1 , Ý rž/ r
r0
Ž. Ž . Ž. Ž. where   w1  w1r 1. Now  0i frq w11  , and  0i frq; rr r
rŽ. together with 0 j, k 1, we get
rr ww wrw 1 ww r Ž.  Ž. Ž .  1    j, k   1 . ÝÝ rr ž/ ž/ rr
rqr q
Consider the left-most sum. It equals
rr w1 w w1rw r Ž. Ž. Ž .Ž .  1   1 Gq Gq , ÝÝ w1 w ž/ ž / rr
rqr q
Ž. where G 	 denotes the cumulative distribution function of a sum of n independent Bernoulli n
random variables, each one having the value 0 with probability  and the value 1 with probability
Ž 1. Using the normal approximation yields  denotes the standard normal cumulative distribu-
. tion function :
11
Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž. Gq Gq  x  y O O , w1 w ž/ ž/ ' 'Ž. w w1
where
Ž. Ž. Ž. q w11  qw 1
x and y ;
Ž. Ž. Ž. '' w1  1 w 1
37 If  were a strictly positive matrix, then  w1 w0 would be a standard result, because
then  w would converge to the invariant matrix. However, we know only that the diagonal
elements are positive. This implies that, if w is large, then with high probability there will be a
positive fraction of periods when the process does not move. But this number is random, so the
Ž probabilities of going from j to k in w steps or in w1 steps should be almost the same since it is
. like having r ‘‘stay put’’ transitions versus r1.CORRELATED EQUILIBRIUM 1149
ŽŽ .12.Ž 12.Ž the two error terms Ow 1 and Ow are given by the Berry-Esseen Theorem see ´
Ž. . Ž 12. Feller 1965, Theorem XVI.5.1 . By deﬁnition of q we have x0 and yOw . The
Ž. Ž. Ž . Ž12. derivative of  is bounded, so  x  y Ox y Ow . Altogether, the left-most sum
Ž 12. is Ow .Asimilar computation applies to the right-most sum. Q.E.D.
 i 2 12 Ž. Ž . PROOF OF STEP M8: Steps M5 and M7 imply  j, s Owtw . The formula of t,w
Step M2 then yields
w2
12  R 	EA 
h O w . tt wt ž/ t
Ž   Ž 1.. Adding over w1,2,..., note that Ý w O  for 1 and substituting into Step w1
Ž. M1 i gives the result. Q.E.D.
 PROOF OF STEP M9: We use the inequality of Step M8 for tt and t t . Because nn 1 n
Ž. 53 53 Ž 23. 3 Ž 2. 12 Ž 5313.Ž 2.  n1  n On ,w ehave  On and t On On , and the
result follows. Q.E.D.
 ŽŽ . . PROOF OF STEP M10: We use the following result see Loeve 1978, Theorem 32.1.E : `
Ž. THEOREM Strong Law of Large Numbers for Dependent Random Variables : Let X be a n
sequence of random ariables and b a sequence of real numbers increasing to 
, such that the series n

 Ž.2 Ý var X b conerges. Then n1 nn
n 1
    X EX
X ,...,X 0 a.s. Ý   1 1 n
 bn 1
22 2 Ž. We take b t , and X b  b  t  t  .B yStep M1 ii we have nn n n t n 1 tn t n 1 t nn 1 nn 1
 Ž 2.Ž 73.Ž . 2 Ž 143. 203 Ž 2. X Ot  On , thus Ý var x b Ý On n Ý O 1n 	
. Next, nn n n n n n n n
Step M9 implies
Ž.  1032Ž 1033 .Ž 13. 1bE X 
X ,...,X On  On n On 0. ÝÝ n  1 1 ž/
n n
Ž. Applying the Theorem above thus yields that  , which is nonnegative and equals 1b Ý X , tn   n  n
must converge to 0 a.s. Q.E.D.
 2  Ž.  PROOF OF STEP M11: Since  Ý Rj , k , the previous Step M10 implies that tj  kt nn
Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž 1. Rj , k 0 a.s. n
, for all jk. When t tt ,w ehave Rj , k Rj , k On by tn n 1 tt n n
Ž. the inequality of Step M3, so Rj , k 0 a.s. t
. Q.E.D. t
REFERENCES
Ž. AUER, P., N. CESA-BIANCHI,Y .F REUND, AND R. E. SCHAPIRE 1995 : ‘‘Gambling in a Rigged Casino:
The Adversarial Multi-Armed Bandit Problem,’’ in Proceedings of the 36th Annual Symposium on
Foundations of Computer Science, 322331.
Ž. AUMANN,R .J . 1974 : ‘‘Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies,’’ Journal of Mathe-
matical Economics,1 ,6 7 96.
Ž.  1987 : ‘‘Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality,’’ Econometrica,
55, 118.
Ž. BANOS,A . 1968 : ‘‘On Pseudo-Games,’’ The Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 39, 19321945. ˜
Ž. BLACKWELL,D . 1956a : ‘‘An Analog of the Minmax Theorem for Vector Payoffs,’’ Paciﬁc Journal of
Mathematics,6 ,1 8.SERGIU HART AND ANDREU MAS-COLELL 1150
Ž.  1956b : ‘‘Controlled Random Walks,’’ in Proceedings of the International Congress of
Mathematicians 1954, Vol. III, ed. by E. P. Noordhoff. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 335338.
Ž. BROWN,G .W . 1951 : ‘‘Iterative Solutions of Games by Fictitious Play,’’ in Actiity Analysis of
Production and Allocation, Cowles Commission Monograph 13, ed. by T. C. Koopmans. New York:
Wiley, pp. 374376.
Ž. CAHN,A . 2000 : ‘‘General Procedures Leading to Correlated Equilibria,’’ The Hebrew University of
Jerusalem, Center for Rationality DP-216.
Ž. CAMERER, C., AND T.-H. HO 1998 : ‘‘Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning in Coordination
Games: Probability Rules, Heterogeneity, and Time-Variation,’’ Journal of Mathematical Psychol-
ogy, 42, 305326.
Ž. EREV, I., AND A. E. ROTH 1998 : ‘‘Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in
Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria,’’ American Economic Reiew, 88,
848881.
Ž. FELLER,W . 1965 : An Introduction to Probability Theory and its Applications, Vol. II, 2nd edition.
New York: Wiley.
Ž. FOSTER, D., AND R. V. VOHRA 1993 : ‘‘A Randomization Rule for Selecting Forecasts,’’ Operations
Research, 41, 704709.
Ž.  1997 : ‘‘Calibrated Learning and Correlated Equilibrium,’’ Games and Economic Behaior,
21, 4055.
Ž.  1998 : ‘‘Asymptotic Calibration,’’ Biometrika, 85, 379390.
Ž.  1999 : ‘‘Regret in the On-line Decision Problem,’’ Games and Economic Behaior, 29, 735.
Ž. FUDENBERG, D., AND D. K. LEVINE 1995 : ‘‘Universal Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play,’’
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 19, 10651089.
Ž.  1998 : Theory of Learning in Games. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Ž.  1999 : ‘‘Conditional Universal Consistency,’’ Games and Economic Behaior, 29, 104130.
Ž. HANNAN,J . 1957 : ‘‘Approximation to Bayes Risk in Repeated Play,’’ in Contributions to the Theory
of Games, Vol. III, Annals of Mathematics Studies 39, ed. by M. Dresher, A. W. Tucker, and P.
Wolfe. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 97139.
Ž. HART, S., AND A. MAS-COLELL 1999 : ‘‘A General Class of Adaptive Strategies,’’ The Hebrew
University of Jerusalem, Center for Rationality DP-192, forthcoming in Journal of Economic
Theory.
Ž.  2000 : ‘‘A Stimulus-Response Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium,’’ The Hebrew
Ž. University of Jerusalem, Center for Rationality mimeo .
Ž. HART, S., AND D. SCHMEIDLER 1989 : ‘‘Existence of Correlated Equilibria,’’ Mathematics of Opera-
tions Research, 14, 1825.
Ž. LOEVE,M . 1978 : Probability Theory, Vol. II, 4th edition. Berlin: Springer-Verlag. `
Ž. LUCE,R .D., AND H. RAIFFA 1957 : Games and Decisions. New York: Wiley.
Ž. MARIMON,R . 1996 : ‘‘Learning from Learning in Economics,’’ in Adances in Economic Theory, ed.
by D. Kreps. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ž. MEGIDDO,N . 1980 : ‘‘On Repeated Games with Incomplete Information Played by Non-Bayesian
Players,’’ International Journal of Game Theory,9 ,157167.
Ž. MERTENS, J.-F., S. SORIN, AND S. ZAMIR 1995 : ‘‘Repeated Games, Part A,’’ CORE DP-9420
Ž. mimeo .
Ž. MYERSON,R .B . 1997 : ‘‘Dual Reduction and Elementary Games,’’ Games and Economic Behaior,
21, 183202.
Ž. NAU,R .F., AND K. F. MCCARDLE 1990 : ‘‘Coherent Behavior in Noncooperative Games,’’ Journal
of Economic Theory, 50, 424444.
Ž. ROBINSON,J . 1951 : ‘‘An Iterative Method of Solving a Game,’’ Annals of Mathematics, 54, 296301.
Ž. ROTH,A .E., AND I. EREV 1995 : ‘‘Learning in Extensive-Form Games: Experimental Data and
Simple Dynamic Models in the Intermediate Term,’’ Games and Economic Behaior,8 ,164212.
Ž. SANCHIRICO,C .W . 1996 : ‘‘A Probabilistic Model of Learning in Games,’’ Econometrica, 64,
13751393.